The diary provides an extensive record of the political developments which took place in Surakarta over these years. Its information is not, however, presented as a continuous narrative, and the author never supplies a resume of previous events; nor does she set her narrative within a framework of political theory. It therefore often appears cryptic to an outsider, and more so on those occasions where it is clear that the diarist herself was not party to the political strategies of all those involved in the developments unfolding as she wrote. Even Mangkunδgara himself, with whom the diarist was closest, may at times have had reason to be less than frank and open with her about his intentions. Nevertheless, the general trend of developments in the different relationships involved could not be kept secret, and angry interviews and hurried nocturnal consultations did not escape the notice of the court abdi (retainers). It is clear too that MangkunSgara liked to maintain the morale of his followers by keeping them informed of any political gain he felt he had made, or any stand he took for what he believed was right. Because of the sometimes artless, sometimes summary, style of the diarist, and the sparseness of her interpretative comment, the present writer has found it essential to use the letters of V.O.C. officials, reporting on the political developments they saw, to fill in the lacunae and elucidate the way in which a linked series of events unfolded in Surakarta over this period: on their own, the entries of the diary often appear as a series of not obviously connected stills, like the changing pictures of a bioscope.
The diary provides an extensive record of the political developments which took place in Surakarta over these years. Its information is not, however, presented as a continuous narrative, and the author never supplies a resume of previous events; nor does she set her narrative within a framework of political theory. It therefore often appears cryptic to an outsider, and more so on those occasions where it is clear that the diarist herself was not party to the political strategies of all those involved in the developments unfolding as she wrote. Even Mangkunδgara himself, with whom the diarist was closest, may at times have had reason to be less than frank and open with her about his intentions. Nevertheless, the general trend of developments in the different relationships involved could not be kept secret, and angry interviews and hurried nocturnal consultations did not escape the notice of the court abdi (retainers). It is clear too that MangkunSgara liked to maintain the morale of his followers by keeping them informed of any political gain he felt he had made, or any stand he took for what he believed was right. Because of the sometimes artless, sometimes summary, style of the diarist, and the sparseness of her interpretative comment, the present writer has found it essential to use the letters of V.O.C. officials, reporting on the political developments they saw, to fill in the lacunae and elucidate the way in which a linked series of events unfolded in Surakarta over this period: on their own, the entries of the diary often appear as a series of not obviously connected stills, like the changing pictures of a bioscope. The material of the diary has not been amalgamated with that from the V.O.C. archives, however: the testimony of the diarist is presented in italics followed by the data from V.O.C. archives and the present writer 1 s comments and explanations. By this separation, it is hoped that the reader may be able to form some idea of the perceptions of the two sides of a particular political and cultural encounter, and to see where they diverge and where they coincide. It should be noted that only entries dealing with political events of major importance have been included, and that many others, noting less important "political" events, 1. Omission of this detail weakens, however, the impression that the diary gives of a fairly high level of political turbulence: see below p. 109.
been omitted in the interests of brevity and relative coherence of presentation. Developments are presented in simple chronological order, as they occur in the diary. Initially, it had seemed that a better analytical perspective might be achieved by analyzing the different relationships involved-between the Mangkunδgaran and the Pakubuwanan houses, between the Pakubuwanan and the V.O.C., between the Mangkunδgaran and Yogyakarta, etc.-under separate headings, but this separation was impossible to maintain, for developments (or even expected developments) in one relationship clearly very much affected the balance of others.
Prelude
The first entry dealing with political affairs of major importance occurs under In the events of 1790-91, an alleged undertaking by Siberg that Mangkunδgara would become ruler of Yogyakarta if the first Sultan predeceased him was to be a major factor in the maneuvers of the different parties. This record in the diary supports the interpretation that Mangkunegara, at least, genuinely believed that such an undertaking had been made by a representative of the V.O.C. As regards the second part of the entry, it is noticeable how, even outside times of crisis or of succession to the throne, the Mangkunδgaran was very conscious of the proximity of Yogyakarta. There are a number of entries in the diary reporting the presence of Mataram "spies,"
4 presumably with a reciprocal interest in Surakarta.
In by the Sunan. The diarist τ s entry on these admonitory letters is unfortunately very briefunfortunately, because it tells us only enough to know that these letters must have been in the same vein as two which were discovered in Surakarta nearly eighteen months later, and which caused Greeve, Siberg τ s successor as Governor of the northeast coast, a great deal of concern on account of their political implications.
Greeve τ s two letters purport to be from a king who is "from Mecca" but has a Javanese title (Susuhunan Ayunjaya Adimurti Senapati Ingalaga) and who will come soon and displace the present king of Sala. The latter is described as dishonoring his royal and priestly forbears, being himself nothing less than the DeviΓs king, a rebel against God and the angels, an enemy of his country, one who gives no good law, and in whose land food and clothing are expensive and rain scarce. The letters comment sharply on the present ruler τ s alliance with the Europeans ("A King of the Europeans, you please God no more; it is finished with you; get out, you apostate from the Faith!") and deride his reliance upon them. ("Shall the Europeans, then, indeed be more powerful than God?") They are couched in esoteric terminology and make reference to omens such as rainbows of different colors.
There is a gap of some eighteen months between the letters reported by the diarist and those reported by V.O.C. officials: the diarist mentions no later letters, the V.O.C. officials no earlier ones. Were they the same letters? It is unlikely that they would have remained in circulation for so long, especially if, as the diarist claims, the Sunan wished to suppress them. It seems more probable that the phenomenon of prophetic, warning letters was more widespread than the V.O.C. was aware: Arabic letters posted in mosques were not likely to come to the attention of the Dutch representation, especially since it was then led by the highly unreliable and self-interested Palm. The circumstance that the letters reported by the diarist were posted in the fasting-month lends support to this supposition, for this was the time of year when a devout Muslim could be expected to call on his coreligionists to remember their religious duties. The evidence of the diary also shows that such letters were posted as mosques in places outside the capital (one of them in a region, Pranaraga, where Mangkunδgara's sons held appanages). Finally, the Sunan τ s suppression of the earlier letters suggests that they too were unflattering in their description of his rule.
in the same month, Raden Mas Kareta, half-brother of Mangkun&gara and father of Wίrakusuma, returned to Sala from exile. 8 As we shall see, these relatives of MangkunSgara, and particularly Wirakusuma, were shortly to achieve importance through the actions of the Crown Prince, heir to Pakubuwana III. 
At the end of the month of Dulkaίdah 1712 AJ
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Listed thus without context or background, these events do not immediately suggest that significant developments were underway in Surakarta. From the archival records, however, it is clear that the Crown Prince, though still very young, was already attempting to impose his own ideas. A letter from Palm to Siberg in April 1787 mentions that the recently returned Raden Mas Kareta had been permitted by Pakubuwana III to wear the European clothes (complete with wig) which he favored, but that the Crown Prince had forced him to revert to traditional Javanese attire. lίf This was in the context of the Crown Prince τ s association with "Muslim Popes" who had even, according to Palm, begun attacking the Sultan of Mataram τ s subjects and driving them from their rice-fields. These men, among them Wirakusuma, were subsequently exiled by the Dutch at the request of the old Sunan, and the Crown Prince even thanked the Resident-or so the Resident reported 15 -for only that this happened "some time ago," but Ricklefs dates the visit to 1785 on the basis of Yogyakarta sources. Ricklefs, Jogjakarta, p. 284 n. and p. 298. There seems no reason to doubt the diarist's date, however, in view of her usual accuracy when checked against archival records, and it seems both from the diary and from Greeve τ s letter than only one visit was made.
101: nuZyα ing mal%m jumungah I tanggal kawan wδZαs ingr rabίyolakir I papatih janingrat rawuh I sowαn pangran dipatya I pinanggίyan ing kamar asuka r£mbug I pαbδn Zαn wongr kasultanan I pangran dipatί tinarί II purunδn kZncZng
Ian nora I aturίra pangran dipatya I punapa karsanίng ratu I sumongga karsa nata I kSncSng tumut lamun fcδndo inggίh tumut I punapa karsaning nata I pangran dίpati umίrίng II. Two syllables are lacking from the second line of the second verse; the last vowel here should be an i. showing him what evil counselors they had been. But the elements present in this episode-Islam, nativism and aggression towards Mataram-were to recur in the Crown Prince f s later career as Sunan Pakubuwana IV. As late as 1792 (that is, after the timespan of the diary), he was to request the V.O.C. to allow Wirakusuma to return from exile, a request which was, however, refused. 16 The second important development began with the first tentative steps towards an alliance between the Sunan τ s house and the Mangkunδgaran. In view of the difficulties this would later produce for the V.O.C., it is ironic that the Company itself had first used its influence in promoting the alliance, for the marriage between Mangkunδgara's son and the Sunan τ s daughter was arranged only after Palm τ s intervention. The Sunan had already refused three times to give a daughter to a prince of the Mangkunδgaran. 17 From the diary it becomes clear that at the same time as the Sunan was being pressed by the V.O.C. to consent to this marriage, he was sounding out Mangkunδgara to see if he could count on him as an ally against Matara m. And after the marriage went through, we see the appointment of a liaison officer, Nur Bδsari, for cooperation between the two houses.
Early Mangkunδgara was not the only member of the Surakarta aristocracy who had a quarrel with Palm. Resident Palm died on May 11, 1788, 21 and it was only then that Greeve realized that something was seriously wrong. The Sunan τ s court complained that (apart from insulting them by such offenses against manners as the serving of "spoiled drinks" at receptions), Palm had interfered in their judicial decisions, and exacted an enormous amount of unpaid labor for building works, not only on the Company τ s buildings but also for his private benefit, beating and mistreating the laborers and keeping them from attending to their rice-fields.
22
Mangkunδgara was not the man to be browbeaten into undertaking more than his established obligations, and it was probably because of his obduracy over providing labor and his general resistance to Palm τ s high-handedness that the latter had reported him to Greeve for various misdemeanors. When Greeve informed Mangkunδgara of Palm τ s accusation that he had not attended the Garδbδg celebrations, Mangkunδgara replied that he had been denied access to the palace, and Greeve then requested Palm not to offend the old prince. Palm assured the Governor that "no Javanese, much less Mangkunδgara, has ever been offended by me." Ki Dδmak-according to the diarist a maulana, one distinguished in Islamic learning, and from his name perhaps an authority connected with the religious center of Demak-was accused by Palm of being the author of the two admonitory and "seditious" letters which had so worried Greeve, and, according to the Dutch record, that was the reason for his execution. The "Tanjung Anom" executed with him was implicated in the same matter, for he was named as one of the envoys of the "ruler of Mecca" prophesied in the letters to come and displace the existing, compromised, ruler of Surakarta.
27
Immediately after Palm τ s death, Greeve received a letter from Pakubuwana III which actually requested the Residents dismissal, and, among many other complaints, claimed that Palm had enforced the burning of Ki Dδmak, a form of sentence unheard of on Java. (The diarist, it will be noted, reports that while Tanjung Anom was burnt Ki Dδmak suffered an even more barbarous end.) Greeve himself was never convinced that Ki Dδmak was the real culprit, and the fact that the diarist makes no mention of any letters is not only surprising in view of the Dutch concern to find their author, but also suggests that Ki Dδmak and his associates in the Mangkunδgaran really did have nothing to do with the letters. It seems that Palm had put pressure on the ailing Pakubuwana III to execute Ki Dδmak and thus satisfy his superiors in the Company by providing a culprit. The Sunan had thus been caught between the pressure from Palm and the expected wrath of Mangkunδgara at the execution of the maulana, who was under his protection-reinforced, it would seem, by the Crown Prince τ s resistance to Palm τ s attempts to force his wishes upon the court. At the same time as Greeve received news of the Surakarta court r s numerous complaints about Palm (his action over Ki Dδmak, his insults, his exactions of labor, and hii^ interference in the Sunan f s jurisdiction over his subjects), he was also informed of the dismissal of Tumδnggung Puspanδgara, Palm τ s favorite, whom the Resident had forced the Sunan to appoint in preference to his own son-in-law. 2δ Since Puspanδgara ended his career in the wilderness of Ayah (the usual place of exile from the Surakarta kraton) at the Crown Prince τ s instigation, 29 it is likely that the Prince owed his dismissal to the same political adversary. One question remains as a matter of speculation: did one of those to whom Palm τ s demands were becoming more than could be tolerated-Mangkunδgara himself, Pakubuwana III, or (a more likely candidate than his declining father) the Crown Prince-in fact find a release from the situation in poisoning the odious Resident? Greeve himself suspected that this might have been the case, and it may be that, while Pakubuwana had restricted himself to requesting Palm τ s dismissal, he had been forestalled by the more direct action of one of his relatives.
Palm was replaced by Andries Hartsinck, the Resident of Rδmbang, whose appointment had been recommended by Greeve on May 12 and was ratified before June 12, when the new Resident set out for Surakarta.
30
When Greeve himself visited Surakarta, in August, he had the opportunity of discussing with Mangkunδgara Palm τ s accusation that he had been carrying on a clandestine correspondence with his ex-wife, Ratu Bδndara, who had been back with her father, the Sultan of Yogyakarta, for twenty-five years. Mangkunδgara indignantly denied this accusation. On reviewing the reports he had received from the Yogyakarta Resident, van that Ratu Bδndara had either motivation or opportunity to carry on such a risky connection, Greeve concluded that Palm had in fact manufactured the description he had given (with much circumstantial and sentimental detail) of Mangkunδgara's "confession" to him, "brother Palm," on January 5.
32
Such was the end of Palm's Residency and its legacy. His successor Hartsinck was to provide no fewer surprises.
The Brangtakusuma was one of the numerous sons of Pangeran Rangga of Jajar who were still at large in the Grobogan area. The family was revered because of their descent from the wαZi Sunan Kalijaga and Pangeran Rangga himself had been a rebel of exceptional reputation. It was alleged that Mangkunδgara's eldest son, Pangeran Prabu Amijaya, had supported him, and this may have been the reason behind the MangkunSgaran's unwillingness to assist in the round-up of Rangga τ s sons, though Palm τ s general conduct would have made their cooperation unlikely even on neutral matters. Brangtakusuma and two of his brothers, Ranggakusuma and Sumawijaya, surrendered to Palm, and were interviewed by Greeve on his visit to central Java. Greeve also hoped to persuade the Sultan of Yogyakarta to hand over four other brothers at this time. Subsequently, Brangtakusuma showed evidence that he did not really repent of his former lawless life, and was indeed sent off to SSmarang, on September 1st or 2nd. The two other brothers, appearing more compliant, were provided with the means to live a settled life. These events-the bestowing of the name "Mangkubumi" and the hostile reaction to this act which followed from the side of Yogyakarta-were to be repeated almost exactly in the more serious political crisis of 1790.
The information which Greeve τ s letters give on the events of 1788 is as follows: on June 12 the bestowal of the new name on Pangeran Surya Mataram 36 was noted. On August 22, following upon his visit to Yogyakarta, Greeve wrote to Resident Hartsinck asking him to request Mangkunδgara to agree to accepting another name, which would be given in the name of the "keijzer" (the Sunan) and the Company, and therefore carry even greater honor to the recipient: the Sunan had already agreed to this after Greeve had talked to him. It appears that the Sultan of Yogyakarta had not actually objected to the name Mangkubumi until he heard of the excessive exuberance and glee which Mangkunδgara had displayed over the matter.
3?
After this, the Sultan went so far as to tell his Patih,Danurδja,in the presence of the Yogyakarta Resident van Ijsseldijk that, if any Surakarta men committed offenses (such as cattle stealing or other aggressions) against his people, they should be put to death. Van Ijsseldijk expostulated that assaults against subjects of the other principality were always dealt with by the intervention of the Residents (and not by direct reprisal), and evil consequences would follow if this arrangement were to be abandoned. The Sultan replied that that would not be on his head, and that the name should be withdrawn within ten days.
38
On September 2, Hartsinck reported to Greeve the intrusion of the "large party of armed men" under the command of the Yogyakarta Crown Prince together with Pangeran Ingabei and Pangeran Dipakusuma (also given as Jayakusuma) to Dδlanggu. Later, it appeared that the Sultan had in fact sent out a second armed party.
39
When asked to account for this incident, the Sultan told van Ijsseldijk that the Crown Prince had acted without his knowledge and would be reprimanded. He added, however, that he must have taken this action because he was "his father's son," and could not bear to think of anyone else claiming equality with his father (by assuming the name he had borne as a prince In Java many names could only be taken by people of a certain rank. For obvious reasons, names such as Buminata ("ruler of the world") and Mangkubumi ("he who holds the world in his lap") were the prerogatives of royalty. When a further crisis arose the following year over the second bestowal of the name "Mangkubumi" in Surakarta, the Sultan went so far as to state in a letter to the Company that no two people could have the same name. He claimed that he intended to change the name of his son-in-law Jayaningrat in order not to offend the Surakarta Patih of the same name, who was senior to him; and gave further examples of a junior person being required to give up a certain name already borne by a senior. 1 * 2
Yet it seems that this principle was not applied in any uniform or straightforward manner, at least now that there were three courts more concerned with maintaining their independence of action than with cooperation. Pakubuwana IV was to claim, when the second "Mangkubumi" affair arose, that this name was not currently borne by the Sultan and could therefore be taken by someone else. It may also be noted that "Mangkunδgara" was part of the title of the Yogyakarta Crown Prince (as of all Mataram crown princes) yet was also prominently displayed in Surakarta. It is clear that the fact that "Mangkubumi" had been the Sultan τ s own name, and that its bestowal on a Mangkunδgaran prince had been the occasion for triumphant exuberance, had given particular offense. Yet Pakubuwana III also vetoed "Natakusuma," favored by Mangkunδgara, on the grounds that it was currently borne by a Yogyakarta prince, and would therefore be likely to give rise to further opposition from that side.** 3 While noting the humiliation which the withdrawal of the title "Mangkubumi" had caused in the Mangkunδgaran, the diarist also makes it quite clear that the cause of this humiliation was pressure applied by the Company, in response to the reaction from the Sultan of Mataram over the appropriation of "his" name. Though the Sunan, now very sick, had given way before this pressure he was not himself complicit in the humiliation: rather, he was doing a great deal to improve the fortunes of Mangkunδgara's sons. 48 remarked that, although it was desirable to effect a smooth change of reign, under Company supervision, before Pakubuwana III actually died, such a step had a major disadvantage. This was that it might encourage the considerably older Crown Prince of Yogyakarta to try to assume the throne, against anticipated opposition from the Sultan, whom Greeve saw as a "childish" old man, still, however, possessed of a strong desire to rule. On September 26, Greeve reported that he nίpun I kabeh wong mangkunagaran II (166L).
The term wong anggur (also angguran or pδnαngrgrur) denoted a class of villagers who had no agricultural land of their own, and by extension (at least in central Java where the obligation to perform compulsory labor services was tied to the ownership of land) a person not bound to fixed service and who could freely dispose of his own time. (See C. Poensen, "lets over de Javaansche desa," 4-5.) Fokkens found that the villagers classified as (inter alia) angguran or penanggur were those who were allotted performance of certain services on behalf of the village head, in return for which they were exempted from other usual forms of service. Since the people in this category were often among the more well-todo villagers, and since they could choose to substitute payment in cash or kind for their services to the village head, we should also see them as something of a privileged group. This seems at first sight a very remarkable amount of license for Greeve to have allowed the young Sunan. However, Greeve had been deeply concerned about the effect of Palm τ s high-handedness-his exorbitant requests for unpaid labor and his interference in the Sunan τ s administration of justice-in alienating the old Sunan and the Crown Prince. It is, therefore, not improbable that he did make some such undertaking to the latter-not, perhaps, a wise move. Letters written by the Company's officials give the impression of a curious determination to maintain a belief in the-at bottom-"amiable" and "lovable" character they had ascribed to the future Pakubuwana IV. They failed to consider the possibility that the-to themundesirable attitudes he sometimes displayed were not entirely an overlay which could be removed together with the "evil counselors" believed to have been responsible for it. It was to become apparent when the Crown Prince assumed his father τ s powers that he had unexpectedly firm ideas as to the direction he would take, as well as a surprising ability to reject, however politely, considerable amounts of "fatherly" advice intended by Company officials to deflect him from his path.
It seems that all eyes were on Mangkun£gara's reaction to the Sunαn's death. The heir apparent presented him with a horse to "gain his favor" (m8n<j §t galih) 51 and after the Sunan died, the Resident is said to have told the Governor of an old adat whereby the royal relatives were forbidden to enter the palace upon the monarch's death.
52
The Governor, however, replied that times had changed (sejen mSngko Ian ing nguni) and that it was not necessary to follow this adat since the relatives could not be "planning anything. " However, it was indeed better that Mangkun&gara should not be allowed to enter the palace, for he was a man of stature and senior in rank (ggςte tur kap&rnah tuwa).
Greeve τ s letters provide evidence that Mangkunδgara had actually attempted to use the occasion of Pakubuwana ΠΓs death to try to gain greater power for himself. He had apparently intended to enter the kraton with a large armed party, but was confined to his own residence by Greeve. It seems that Greeve had to impress strongly upon Mangkunδgara that he owed homage to the new Sunan, Pakubuwana IV. On the occasion of the latter τ s investiture, the old prince showed noticeable displeasure and made slighting remarks about the queen-Pakubuwana τ s second wife, the daughter of Pangeran Purbaya. Mangkunδgara also made a request to be allowed to hold his 4,000 cacah as tax-free land, or to be given another 600 cacah. This request was not granted. 53 The diarist is silent on these unsuccessful bids for a stronger position.
Immediately The letter referred to here must be an undated one to Greeve, 57 wherein the Sultan says that he is pleased with the elevation of the Surakarta Crown Prince but that, if Mangkunδgara or his children ask the Company for greater fortune or for the kraton of Surakarta, it will not be agreeable to him. He claims also to have told Hartingh at the time of Gianti [1755] that MangkunSgara's descendants would be, like those of Surapati, enemies of the Company for seven generations. (The consistency with which SurapatΓs descendants had fought on the side aligned against the Dutch in a series of wars had made them something of a legend on Java.) In view of the outstanding loyalty of later Mangkunδgaran princes to the colonial government, however, the Sultan τ s forecast was not an accurate one, though it may perhaps be indicative of the strong anti-Dutch sentiment he perceived in his erstwhile ally, Mangkunegara.
On reading this letter, the Governor smiled, though he went red in the face and inwardly his heart burned. He showed it to the Resident, "who was even less able to conceal his emotion, and ordered 400 troops to be on the alert at all times, and ammunition to be brought from S&marang 58. 171R-172L. His words were: nora prentah-pΐnarentah / wong sala Ian wong matawis II nadyan ίngsun ngundakSna I nama agδng marang uwa dίpatί I muwuhana sawahipun / dudu bawah wong yogya / ya pagene pradulί wong yogya ίku I pama arδp ngayonana I wong yogya mring awak mami II eh payo den ayonana I maksίh fcδncδng si uwa ing ajurit / . . . 59. In fact it took place on 28th Bδsar, i.e. , September 29, 1788. See Pakubuwana IV r s letter of October 3 to the Prince of Orange and Nassau, enclosed in Greeve to Batavia, October 1, 1788, in KA 3708, VOCOB, 1789. As September 29 (28th Bδsar) was a Monday, it seems that the diarist has given the wrong date to the day. 60. This must refer to Mangkunδgara's equerry, Corporal Pieter Bloemhart, who was later, in 1790, to be the principal channel of communication between the Mangkunδgaran household, which was then set on a collision course with the V.O.C., and Governor Greeve. See below, p. 93. 61. These two princes, Buminata and Singasari, brothers of Pakubuwana II, were extremely important figures in Mangkunδgara τ s career, for they had been his close, if not constant, companions through many troubled years. They had gone into rebellion in 1743 and, according to a Babad which describes the "Chinese war," were with Mangkunegara when he assumed his royal title (Pangeran Adipati Anom Mangkunδgara) and status, shortly after his break with the Sunan who had been proclaimed by the pro-Chinese party. This Sunan (Raden Mas Garδndi, the "yellow Sunan") was now about to surrender to the V. Singasari, like Mangkunegara only a teenager in 1743, fought on his side in a number of major battles (such as the attack on Surakarta on July 28, 1750-see Part I, p. 10). Unlike Mangkunδgara, however, he was never to surrender either to the V.O.C. or to any Javanese ruler, and he remained at large in the Malang region, joining forces with Surapati τ s descendants, until he was finally captured in 1768 by the V.O.C. expedition against Balambangan. He died in chains in Batavia before he could be exiled. There seems to have been a significant Islamic element among his following in Malang, and this may have been a cultural characteristic which he had in common with Mangkunδgara (on Singasari, see Ricklefs It is surprising to find no record of this stabbing of Bloemhart, which must surely have made quite a stir in both Dutch and Javanese circles in Surakarta, in the archival letters of the time. There are in fact no letters at all relating to central Javanese affairs between November 10 and December 24, 1788. In this case too the offender was ultimately pardoned, and, in place of a fight between him and a tiger, a tiger-buffalo fight was held.
Scarcely On July 19, 1789, Greeve τ s suspicions of the court at Surakarta were aroused by reports that the Sunan was plotting to slaughter all Europeans in Java. This information, from a young Javanese woman, was passed on to him not by the Surakarta Resident but by the Dutch Commandant at Salatiga. When Greeve asked Hartsinck to make an investigation, the latter reported that all was in order at the court except for the presence of two-"popes," Raden Santri and Bahman, who had a wide following which included the Sunan, Mangkunδgara's grandson Prang Wadana, and many other princes. It was owing to the influence of these "popes" that the Acte van Overeenkomst--an agreement laying down procedures for regulating trade and for solving problems that might arise between the principalities from disputes over land and water rights and from theft, highway robbery, etc.--had not been signed: this is clearly the unspecified "contract" mentioned by the diarist. Mangkunδgara himself had allegedly recommended that the Company "get rid of" these "popes" by secret means rather than enter into a confrontation with the young Sunan; but Greeve considered that this would be too risky. At the same time, the Yogyakarta Resident, van Ijsseldijk, reported that the kraton there had received information that Pakubuwana IV was making regular visits to the mosque, was burning all the European uniforms of his father τ s army, and in fact wished to drive the Europeans from Java altogether. 76 In September, the numerous replacements made by the Sunan among his senior officials became known to Greeve. Resident Hartsinck denied that Wilatikta was a "pope," and claimed that he had just been appointed to replace a sick man. This is certainly in conflict with the diary, which represents Wilatikta as the chief of the Sunan τ s guru. Greeve was better informed about the type of man appointed as the new Tumδnggung of Dayaluhur, but, again, the information came from a source other than Hartsinck. It was the Resident of Tδgal, J. L. Umbgrove, who reported that, when he had asked this "knave" to come and see him, and offered him a drink of wine or beer to congratulate him on his appointment, the new Tumδnggung had actually refused, and said that his predecessor had been too fond of this "Dutch custom." 77 Greeve decided to write to the Sunan, warning him of the dangers of having such evil advisers and asking him to arrest them as a sign of his trust and friendship with the Company. He had had no doubt that this request would be fulfilled, and was therefore dumbfounded when the Sunan refused, saying that Greeve should not listen to evil rumors. He himself would guarantee the advisers: surely the Company trusted his word? After the promotion of Raden Santri, Greeve noted that the whole principality was virtually in the hands of this man, as the Surakarta Patih was only a "foolish creature." He also noted that the Sunan was technically within his rights in making these replacements since, according to the contracts with the V.O.C., only the appointment of a patih required both parties τ approval. It may be that he was at this stage deliberately using his untrammeled rights over other appointments to isolate the Patih, and deprive him of all power of action. In reporting the promotion of Raden Santri, Hartsinck echoes the words used by the diarist the Sunan had said that he would now see whether the man was good or bad. Greeve was also greatly shocked by Hartsinck τ s nocturnal visit to the kraton: he spent some effort in enquiring from the other European office-holders in Surakarta just exactly what Hartsinck had been wearing (Jbδbδd or long trousers?). In either case, the visit was a disgraceful departure from the proper ceremony which should attend a Residents visit to a Sunan. Furthermore, stylistic changes in the Javanese of the Sunan τ s letters seemed to provide evidence that Hartsinck himself had had a hand-for whatever reason-in the composition of recent letters to Greeve. 78 It is striking that the evidence both of the diary and of Greeve τ s informants indicates that Pakubuwana IV was taking a pro-Islamic and anti-European direction: attending the mosque and reading the fcuίbαh 79 (as his brothers Pangeran Pamot and Pangeran Arya Mataram-later Mangkubumi-also did on some occasions), instructing his men to perform their prayers properly, 80 sending a party to inspect the Dδmak mosque with a view of building a replica, 81 forbidding alcohol and opium, 82 replacing European clothes with Javanese or Middle Eastern styles, 83 and reportedly planning to attack the Europeans in residence. It is also striking that Mangkunδgara ? s dream bracketed together not only the Dutch and their chief ally at Surakarta, Pangeran Purbaya, but also the Chinese-half a century after the "Chinese war" in which the young Mangkunegara had taken the side of the proChinese party against the V.O.C. His sentiments of this period, bracketing the Dutch and Chinese together as allies, point forward to the Java War. The locus of this rebellion, which is described in Greeve's letter to Batavia of October 24, 1789, 85 was the Pδngging area northwest of Surakarta. Since those involved seemed to be the Sultan τ s subjects-the "Putat" mentioned by the diarist is presumably the village of that name in the Grobogan region-they were handed over to him. He subsequently gave them back to Surakarta, saying that they had only resided in his territory for a short time. The Sultan said he had made an inquiry into the matter which had found that those concerned were simple-minded. Believing their "rebellion" to be blessed with supernatural help, they had marched through the countryside singing and making no attempt to conceal their presence. The Sunan took the matter more seriously, however, since their aim had apparently been to take his kraton.
From about this time relations between Sala and Yogyakarta begin to command significantly more of the diarist's attention. On the first day of 1716 AJ
The Sultan did exile some members of his court at about this time: the son and four grandsons of his dead younger brother, Pangeran Mangkukusuma. In a letter of 12 Sura 1716 AJ (October 2, 1789 AD), 86 he notified the V.O.C. that he was exiling them for their "bad behavior" and the insecurity they had caused in the city; no mention is made of an incursion into Surakarta territory. It may be that the diarist, as a loyal member of the Mangkunδgaran household, blamed every disturbance on the Sultan; it is equally possible that the Sultan was in fact trying to conceal his support of this incursion and attempting to make it appear the spontaneous inspiration of a few simple-minded people.
There seems to be no record in the letters of this period of any other "Mataram spy" being captured by Mangkunδgara's men and subsequently handed over to the Dutch factory.
Over 
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Greeve had now reported Hartsinck 1 s unsatisfactory performance of his duties to the Governor-General and Council, and on November 6 received their decision to dismiss Hartsinck from his post. Greeve did in fact then suggest that Hartsinck be replaced by the (First, not Second) Resident of TSgal, J. L. Umbgrove, who was the son-in-law of Governor-General Alting, as the diarist states. Alting did not, however, accept Greeve's suggestion-perhaps he already had Umbgrove in mind for the lucrative Residency of Cirebon to which he was appointed the following year, and where Alting liked to have a member of his family. τ s Japan factory but with previous experience in Java) had been nominated as First Resident of Surakarta. In the meantime Hartsinck, who had asked to remain on in the city until he could wind up his affairs, was granted permission to stay on until August 1790, 9l * and did not actually leave until September 4.
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The TumSnggung (i.e., Bupati) of Banyumas, whose widow plays so prominent a part in the slander campaign reported by the diarist, was YudanSgara. Pakubuwana III had dismissed him in 1780 because of a secret overland mission to BantSn he had made apparently for the Sultan of Yogyakarta, to whom his father (Danureja I) was Patih.
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Reports from 1772 allege that MangkunSgara had some sort of conspiratorial relationship with YudanSgara at that time, 97 and the evident personal enmity between the Prince and YudanSgara τ s unfaithful wife would be understandable in such a context. It seems that her slanders had little effect, probably because MangkunSgara was then well placed with the Sunan, and Hartsinck was no longer in a position to do him harm with the V.O.C.
Even more interesting perhaps is the diarist τ s allegation that Hartsinck was involved with a court faction and had offered to pay Pangeran Rangga 500 real if he were continued in his post as Resident. At first sight, it seems unlikely that a 92. 223R-224L. Dutch Resident would rely on a faction of the Javanese aristocracy to forward his career. Yet Hartsinck τ s behavior up to this point had been so strange as to warrant his removal: he had delayed reporting any news of the Sunan's suspicious activities until Greeve heard about these from an unofficial source; he had denied that Wilatikta was a "pope" or that his appointment betokened anything out of the way, though Greeve had heard, again from a source other than Hartsinck, that Wilatikta had openly spoken against Dutch ways; and it appears that he had even been helping the Sunan to compose his correspondence to the Company (not to speak of making nocturnal visits to the kraton in Javanese dress). All these things point to Hartsinck τ s serving two masters to advance his own affairs, so that the diarist τ s claim that he had offered 500 real to secure his position is not so fantastic. The most probable reconstruction of the sequence of events to this point is as follows: the Sunan, in his moves to replace the officials of his father τ s reign with his own appointees and in general to strengthen his own position, had mobilized his troops, and taken the additional precaution of buying off the V.O.C. Resident. Susceptibility to money bribes was not unknown among Residents, even after the demise of the V.O.C., with its notoriously "corrupt" officialdom. We find later cases, such as that of the Surakarta Resident Rijck van Prehn, who was dismissed in 1820 after receiving 2,000 real for his complaisance in the appointment of Secawikrama as Patih, 6,000 real for a similar attitude in the appointment of Pangeran Purbanδgara as Bupati of Kδdiri, and in all a total of 14,500 real in such payments. 98 It would seem that, when*Greeve announced to Hartsinck that he was going to be replaced as Resident, the direction of the money-flow was reversed,as Hartsinck attempted to induce his associates to guarantee his continuation in his appointment. The obvious question is why he should think that these Javanese associates would be able to exert any influence on V.O.C. decisions. The answer may be found in Greeve τ s attitude. The Governor had been very shocked at the revelation-after Palm's unexpected death-of the amount of offense Hartsinck's predecessor had given the Surakarta aristocracy over a whole range of matters." Greeve had then actually taken the trouble to write a memorandum to Hartsinek, 100 when he took up his new appointment, instructing him to achieve a position of influence with the Sunan, the Crown Prince, and Mangkunδgara, by winning their trust with friendly treatment. Hartsinck had certainly done so, and may have hoped that the amicable, complaisant relationship he had established with the aristocracy would be all he needed to ensure the V.O.C. τ s blessing for his continuance in office: and why not pick the fruits of this amicable connection?
The Company had, then, been represented by two very different, but equally dangerous, representatives in Surakarta. The first, Palm, had thought he could bully the Javanese aristocracy into acting as his lackeys and provisioners and had thoroughly offended them by his contemptuous breaches of established procedure. The second, Hartsinck, seems to have accepted the role of a passive accomplice and made himself comfortable in this, abandoning the vigilance, faithful reporting, and subtle manipulation of the political balance which the V.O.C. required from men in his position. There is no doubt that the significant blank areas in Hartreporting contributed significantly to the developing crisis. Greeve received the news, "as unexpected as unpleasant," of the Sunan τ s bestowal of the contentious name Mangkubumi, in a brief letter from Hartsinck of May 6.
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He was immediately anxious about the probable repercussions in Mataram.
The "secret expedition" under Kanduruhan Wilatikta was not reported to Greeve: it is impossible to tell whether Hartsinck knew anything of it. However, the evidence of the diary that the Sunan was beginning to take an aggressive attitude to Mataram (and the giving of this name cannot, in the Javanese context, have been intended as anything less than a calculated insult) is strengthened by the fact that Greeve received letters from Mangkunδgara claiming that van Straalendorff (First Resident of Surakarta 1767-84) had promised him on two occasions that he would be given the throne of Mataram on the Sultan τ s death. It seems clear that Mangkunδgara knew that something was in the wind, and was endeavoring to find out what profit he could expect if he remained on the Company τ s side instead of joining the Sunan in his planned agression against Mataram.
Mangkunδgara claimed that van Straalendorff had made this promise to him in the name of the "Edelheer at Sδmarang" (the Governor of the northeast coast) on 2 Jumadilakir 1700 AJ and again on 26 Sapar Je 1710 AJ. outside the period covered by the diary, but under the second date the diarist has in fact entered a note recording just such a promise (see above, p. 68). This indicates that MangkunSgara genuinely believed he had been given such an undertaking. Further, it is not at all improbable that van Straalendorff had at least hinted at such a possibility: the Company was very prone to the use of threats or bribes with Javanese princes and, as de Jonge has remarked, 104 * frequently did not keep its word. This was, indeed, a technique which Greeve himself was to use later with Pakubuwana IV.
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Not surprisingly, the disillusionment he underwent sometimes led the prince concerned to become embittered towards the V.O.C. and even on occasion to become dishonest in his own behavior.
Greeve was alarmed to hear of Mangkunδgara τ s claims on Yogyakarta. He postponed giving Mangkunegara an answer while he made enquiries about the military situation. These revealed that Mangkunegara had at least 500 men in his household, on wages, and could easily summon another three to four thousand. His informant remarked that Mangkunegara was popular among his men-"criminal wretches" as many of them were-because of his former leadership in war and because of the good treatment and protection which he always gave them. The Company^ military reserves, in contrast, numbered exactly 243.
10G
Greeve himself was of the opinion that MangkunSgara could in fact call up as many as 10,000 men within three days.
In his letter of June II, 107 Greeve, who was then trying to persuade the Sunan to change the offending name to "PugSr," reported that there had been no military movements so far (the diarist's evidence suggests that minor skirmishes 'were already taking place), although he had received a report that the Sunan and MangkunSgara had formed a contingency plan for the eventuality of the Sultan τ s death. This would involve blocking passage for the Company τ s troops to Yogyakarta. Greeve did not believe this information, although he did request military reinforcements and tried to arrange for the Sultan's abdication in favor of the Crown Prince, under Company auspices. By June 24, it was clear that the Sultan would not agree to this, 108 and was, moreover, extremely annoyed because MangkunSgara's grandson Prang Wadana was reputedly giving shelter to Yogyakarta highway robbers. Van Ijsseldijk reported that he had had the greatest difficulty in preventing the Sultan from seeking justice himself. 109 MangkunSgara denied that his people were supporting these robbers, although he said that he had formed three complete companies of prajurit from Yogyakarta refugees.
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Through June and July Greeve and the Sunan continued to argue their respective positions about the contentious name: Greeve claimed that "PugSr" was a more prestigious name and could be accepted without humiliation as a mark of the special favor of the Sunan and the V.O.C.; the prince who was to be so distinguished then himself claimed that he did not have sufficient lands and men to live up to such a high title; the Sunan agreed to add Greeve f s "Pugδr" to his brothers name, but not to withdraw the previously bestowed "Mangkubumi," saying that he could not go back on what he had publicly confirmed. He said that the Sultan, who, after all, no longer used the name "Mangkubumi," was behaving very wrongly in relaying threats to him via the Company,instead of addressing him in a friendly way as a fellow ruler; and that he did not intend to be misused as his father had been in 1788 (that is, on the occasion of the bestowal of the same contentious name on MangkunSgara's grandson and its subsequent withdrawal because of pressure from the Company).
J. K. J. de Jonge, De Opkomst von het Nederlondsch Gezog in Oost Indie
111
Greeve τ s attitude towards the Sultan was very ambiguous. On the one hand, having received reports that four to five thousand soldiers were being paraded in Yogyakarta, 112 the Governor was fearful of aggression from the Sultan, and therefore reproached him for his belligerent stance. On the other hand, he felt that it was necessary to ensure the Sultan τ s military cooperation in the event of an attempt by Mangkunegara to conquer Mataram. 113 Van Ijsseldijk reported that the Sultan had declined to give precise information about the size of the military force available to him, merely saying that he had "enough" men; and that he had broken off all correspondence with Surakarta. 114 Greeve later estimated that the Sultan's forces would total about 7,000 men, the same as those of the Sunan.
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Greeve was gathering together as many troops as the various stations of the V.O.C. could spare: he detained about 120 on their way from east Java to Ceylon, 116 and a further forty-five men and three officers arrived in Sδmarang by ship a little later.
117
He then received 119 Wiirttemberger troops from the Cape garrison and 250 troops from Batavia. But high mortality and sickness ate into these numbers, so that Greeve found it necessary to detain another fifty troops bound for Malacca.
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By August 6, minor skirmishes were reported between the Sultan τ s and Sunan τ s men, causing the deaths of a few combatants on either side. By the end of the month Greeve had managed to strengthen each of the central Javanese garrisons by a hundred men and now asked permission to use [another] fifty men who had been bound for Malacca, ninety-six sepoys who had arrived from Makassar under their own officers, as well as one or two companies of Wύrttembergers.
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Feeling that the military situation was now sufficiently in the Company τ s favor, he at last passed on to MangkunSgara the letter containing the Governor-General's statement of June 11 to the effect that he, Mangkun&gara, had no hope of succeeding to the Yogyakarta Sultanate. Greeve had long feared what the reaction to this letter might be.
In the event, however, Mangkunδgara took this disappointment without public protest, writing politely to Greeve that he would always follow the Greeve was beginning to have a hopeful view of the prospect of preserving the peace (at least for the time being) when this was dispelled by the news that the Sultan's troops had attacked villages of both Mangkunegara and the Sunan, the former on account of Mangkunδgara's pretensions to the Yogyakarta throne, and the latter on account of the insult offered by the bestowal of the name Mangkubumi. The Sultan and the Crown Prince of Yogyakarta claimed that they for their part had suffered a number of attacks by the Mangkunδgaran: that Mangkunδgara's grandson by marriage, Jayawinata, had plundered a Yogya village and burnt and robbed a Chinese tollgate; and that his son Suryakusuma had plundered the Sultan^ mancanagara subjects on their way to Yogya with their yearly offerings of produce.
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Greeve not only told van Ijsseldijk to expostulate with the Sultan over these attacks, but also decided to withhold the moneys paid to him for the coastal tolls, usually collected at the beginning of September and the major source of monetary income for the Javanese rulers. A few days later, however, he decided to let the Sultan have the money after all, in order, he said, not to seem to be favoring the Sunan.
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The new Surakarta Resident, van Reede, reported that Mangkunδgara was not returning these Yogyakarta attacks, saying that, even if the Mataram soldiers appeared before his very dαlδm, he would sit still and do nothing without orders from the Sunan and the Company. Later, however, van Reede received news that ιMangkunδgara ! s men had, in fact, devastated a village in the Bayalali area, though Mangkunδgara himself denied knowledge of this, 123 and it seems that his grandson Prang Wadana was responsible.
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Van Ijsseldijk suggested at this juncture that Mangkunδgara and his family should swear an oath to live in peace with Mataram. The Sultan subsequently agreed to withdraw his troops from the field if this were done, but refused to reopen relations with Surakarta until the name was retracted. The Sunan said that he had no men in th^ field except a few under his brother Mangkubumi whom he had sent out to defend his villagers, and would now withdraw. Mangkunδgara also said that he had only defensive postings, and asked the Company either to bring about a real and lasting peace or to allow him to take his revenge. The Surakarta side also asked for compensation for the devastation caused. 125 On September 9, van Ijsseldijk reported to Greeve that Mangkunδgara τ s men had actually murdered the Sultan's nephew, Raden Sumadikara, and brought his head to Surakarta, and had taken prisoner a brother-in-law of the Yogyakarta Crown Prince. The Sultan was furious, and only the "courageous action" of the 120. Mangkunδgara to Greeve, August 29, in Greeve to Batavia, September 4, in KA 3833, VOCOB, 1792. This step was partly motivated by a letter he had received from the Sunan suggesting that, since there were likely to be many pretenders to the Sultan^ throne after his death, trouble could be avoided by dividing Yogyakarta among his children. Greeve felt this proposal would destroy the necessary equipoise between the two kingdoms, which was the foundation of the Company τ s mastery of Java, and that it was probably a cover for the Sunan τ s plan to swallow the fragments of Mataram one by one. Greeve τ s diary (in KA 3833) gives the following account of the events between September 15 and the swearing of the oath by the two Patih: on the vexed question of the name, he made the surprising discovery that before bestowing it, the Sunan, mindful of Yogyakarta τ s reaction in 1788, had actually discussed the matter with Hartsinck, who had allegedly told him that he was perfectly within his rights to call his brother "Mangkubumi." Greeve summoned Hartsinck back from Sδma-rang to Surakarta (which he had left only on September 4) and extracted from him a confession of his responsibility in the affair, which was then sent on to the Sultan. Greeve told the Sunan that, since Hartsinck had given him the Company τ s permission, however wrongly, the Company would not now ask him to withdraw the name Mangkubumi. On September 21 a Yogyakarta party arrived and asked if the Company would agree to the Sultan τ s bestowing the name "Mangkubumi" on his own grandson, the son of the Crown Prince, by way of compensation for its use in Surakarta. 135 This solution having proved acceptable to all sides, the matter of the name was no longer an issue.
See letter of van
The quarrel between Mangkunδgara and the Sultan was, however, not so easily resolved. Both sides claimed that the other had been the first to attack. Greeve proposed a peace plan, evidently based on van Ijsseldijk τ s earlier suggestion, by which all parties would sign a Contract of Reconciliation (Contract van Bevreedί-gίng). The Yogyakarta reaction to this suggestion was much more favorable than Greeve had hoped, but Mangkunegara continued to insist that the only acceptable token of the Sultan τ s peaceable intentions would be the return of Ratu Bendara and his two sδlir. This was clearly an impossible demand and could only signify that Mangkunδgara meant to obstruct the road to peace. On the 26th of September, however, Mangkunegara sent his European equerry, Corporal Pieter Bloemhart, to tell Greeve that his children, Pangeran Purbanδgara and Pangeran Padmanδgara, were pressing him to adhere to the Sunan τ s counsel, so that he was not able to oblige Greeve in what he had requested. Greeve also received reports that the Mangkunδgaran forces were continuing their attacks.
Moreover, the Sunan τ s behavior still presented difficulties, even after the "Mangkubumi" issue was resolved. On the one hand, he proposed that he should marry one of the daughters of the Yogyakarta Crown Prince and, when Greeve later went to Yogyakarta,asked him to select for him the most beautiful of the princesses. On the other hand, he put a long series of procedural difficulties in the way of the Contract of Reconciliation. Although Greeve τ s diary does not record that the Sunan verbally abused the Yogyakarta party (as described in the Mangkunδgaran diary), he does record that the Sunan unduly delayed sending his Patih on a reciprocal visit to Yogyakarta. 135. This bears out the point made above (p. 76) that, though the Sultan may have claimed categorically that "no two people can have the same name," in practice a more flexible approach was adopted. The solution of this particular case, invoking as it did a counter-principle (perhaps new) of parity between the two courts, apparently allowed Yogyakarta to feel that honor was satisfied.
After the Patih of Yogyakarta and of Surakarta had finally put their seals on the Contract on September 28, Greeve told MangkunSgara that he too must put his seal on it, on the following day. Mangkunδgara continued, however, to insist on the return of his wife and sδlir, and his equerry Bloemhart told Greeve that Mangkunδgara had had a conference with his sons and his grandson Prang Wadana. Later in the day, Mangkunδgara told Greeve that, if he were compelled to renounce his wife and sδlir, the Company should do something to compensate him, as it had so often said that he was under its protection, and he had put up with so much bitterness in its name. He asked for 4,000 cacah; Greeve offered 4,000 real per annum, but Mangkunδgara said that he could not "sell his wife for money." He also told Greeve that it was the Sunan who was forcing him to be intransigent; and Greeve himself knew that five of Mangkunegara's sons held appointments from the Sunan, and could lose these if the Sunan were alienated. At the same time, Greeve was receiving information, via the V.O.C. τ s chief ally, Pangeran Purbaya, that "serious things" were happening in the kraton, and he should be on his guard. The Sunan τ s generally uncooperative behavior gave added credence to these rumors, as he refused to put his seal on Mangkunegara's request to the Sultan of Yogyakarta to provide the 4,000 cacah, and was also unwilling to pay for the upkeep of the V.O.C.'s military reinforcements, saying that he had given Greeve no occasion to bring such a large force.
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Two days later, 137 the Sunan sent a letter to Greeve with a fresh request, that is, that the pZngulu of Sδmarang and of Yogyakarta should be obliged to obtain the approval of the Surakarta pδngulu for marriages they contracted. Greeve postponed answering this letter until peace had been fully restored. In Yogyakarta 11 * 1 Greeve had indeed been unsuccessful in obtaining the 4,000 cacah. The Sultan would not even speak of Ratu BSndara; the sδlir could not be returned because they had borne the Crown Prince's children. He asked Greeve to intervene on his behalf and rescue one of his regents from Mangkunδgara's men. It appears that, at this stage, Mangkunδgara's men had captured considerably more of the Sultan τ s villages than the Sultan τ s men had of his, so that the military advantage was with the Mangkunδgara.
The Mataram raids continued; Mangkun&gara's dδmαngr and a large force under Pangeran Prang Wadana pushed the invaders back, conquered some Yogyakarta villages, and took the heads of four men of rank (Raden
It was officially settled that the name "Mangkubumi" would be given to the Sultan's grandson Pangeran Anom; and that the setting of the Sultan's and Sunan's seals on the Contract of Reconciliation should also take place. The Sultan agreed to ask the Crown Prince to add his seal to the Contract, as Mangkunδgara had requested.
Back in Surakarta, Greeve reported to the Sunan that, although he had in fact seen the Crown Prince's daughters en deshabille, he could not give a good description of their appeal to the eye. The Sunan repeated his request for recognition of the primacy of the Surakarta pδngulu, adding that he wished to be recognized as the "first prince" on Java. Greeve reported to Mangkunδgara his failure to obtain the 4,000 cacah, and the prince once again refused to accept the 4,000 real, saying that this would not compensate for the shame he had suffered.
Greeve excused himself from the reception planned by the Sunan because he feared that it was to be the scene of treachery against the Company, 11 * 2 and returned to Sδmarang. He left the Resident, van Reede, to arrange for the Sunan to put his seal on the Contract.
As News of further attacks by Mangkunδgara's men, in the Gunung Kidul region, came as early as October 13, the day Greeve left Surakarta. Now that he himself was safely back in Sδmarang, Greeve instructed van Reede to tell the Sunan that the Company knew of his underhand support for Mangkunδgara, and also wrote to the Yogyakarta Resident instructing him to take an equally firm stance and warn the Sultan not to resort to force. Greeve continued to strengthen his military backing. Batavia had been unable to supply more troops but had authorized him to hire Madurese, lίtlf and he had asked for 500 from west Madura and 300 from Sumδnδp. He was also assembling in Sδmarang the regents from the pαsisir, who were directly under the V.O.C., with their armed men. There were about 1,500 of these troops by October 27 and half of them were to remain in Sδmarang, together with the Pangeran of Madura and of Sumδnδp with their personal soldiery (numbering 1,500), until the total force of 1,600 they had offered to Greeve had 141. On Greeve's visit to Yogyakarta, see Ricklefs In his letter to Batavia of October 28, 147 Greeve remarked that the Sunan appeared to be withdrawing his support from Mangkunδgara. He was informed of the latter τ s decision to accept the 4,000 real and swear the oath to live in peace with Yogyakarta on November 1st. On the third of the month,the Sultan said that the Yogyakarta Crown Prince would swear a reciprocal oath. Since both sides had suffered damage, their claims for compensation would require further assessment.
Greeve had now bought off Mangkunδgara, and on the 5th he received news that Prang Wadana had fallen out with the "popes." This gave the V.O.C. a much better prospect of bringing the Sunan to heel. Only 260 troops had so far arrived from Madura, but by November 7 Greeve was able to make up his total of 500 west Madurese and 300 from SumδnSp by commandeering men from the personal bodyguards of the two Madurese princes with him in Sδmarang. 149. In fact they continued during the next few weeks: see 260R and 266R.
150. 261R.
151. "Madura" is used in the diary, as it was generally until a much later period, to mean only west Madura, from Bangkalan to Sampang. The information from Greeve τ s diary on the events of these weeks can be summarized as follows: on November 5, Greeve decided that it was essential that the "popes" be handed over to the Company. When he was informed by Pangeran Purbaya on November 9 that the Sunan had decided to "live or die" with them, he made a contingency plan in case the Sunan should flee his kraton. Mangkunδgara-chosen, as Greeve later explained, because he was a formidable man who could "maintain himself," whereas the Sunan τ s son and heir was still a child 158 -would replace him. On the 10th, the 300 Sumenδp troops left Sδmarang for Surakarta, accompanied by fourteen sepoys and some European troops, presumably the thirty soldiers and thirty artillerymen who had arrived on the 8th of the month.
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Many of these had been sick, and Greeve had to draw on the already weak Sδmarang garrison to make up the strength of this force (Diary, November 9). On the 16th, Greeve received news that the Sunan had called up his regents and their armed men, some of whom (those from Banyumas) had already reached Surakarta. On the 18th, news arrived from Yogyakarta that the Sultan had strengthened his forces in the field to far more than 2,000 men, and that his mancanagara regents with another 2,000 would approach Surakarta from the east by the morrow. On the 19th, the 500 west Madurese troops left for Surakarta.
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A review of the above material suggests that Ricklefs τ account of this crisis 161 underestimates the Company τ s military resources, or overstates its military weakness. Ricklefs lists only some of the companies of European troops which arrived in Semarang during this time (the Wϋrttemberg troops but not the 250 from Batavia and the other contingents noted above), 162 enabling Greeve to strengthen the central Javanese garrisons with 100 men each and still to have left a force of 374 men to back him up when he left for central Java. 163 It is true that these European forces were very seriously affected by illness 16Zt and that their deployment for the 155. 262R. 156. In the pαsowαnαn kiduϊ, the pαkδbonαn, around the Mangkunegaran, and on the south side of the pasar pon (leaving only the southeast to the Sunan τ s men). south-central Javanese operation could only be achieved at the cost of weakening the Company τ s other garrison posts; but the Company had also a second arm to its military strength in the "native auxiliary" forces. Apart from the 500 Madurese noted by Ricklefs, 165 Greeve had also obtained 300 men from Sumδnep and had assembled in SSmarang the large force of soldiers mentioned above.
One should not discount the degree to which the services of such troops could be relied upon, especially in view of the fact that the V.O.C. had advanced very large sums of money indeed to Greeve for the purpose of hiring them. 167 This assessment of the Company τ s resources leaves out of consideration the question of how the different central Javanese forces-those of the Sultan of Yogyakarta, estimated at between 4,500 and 7,000 men, those of Mangkunδgara, now estimated at 2,000, and those of the Sunan himself, estimated at 7,000 168 -would in fact have aligned themselves had it come to war.
Retreat
In the event it did not come to war; for on November 20 the Surakarta Resident sent news that the Sunan had decided to relinquish the "popes"-himself suggesting, in fact, that the foremost among his previously most confidential counselors should be executed. Greeve interpreted this to mean that the Sunan would rather take this drastic step than merely hand them over to the Company, because they "knew too much." He told him that the Company did not require their deaths, although he thought that, if the Sunan should insist on this, it would at least be a salutary example to other potential troublemakers. 169 He asked the Sunan that the replacements to the posts vacated by the popes should be "honest men" (brave lieden) and, for these appointments only, should swear an oath of loyalty to the Company. On November 26, news came that the Sunan had handed over the five "chief popes" (as named in the diary) to Pangeran Purbaya, who took them to the V.O.C. fort. The Sunan was granted the Company τ s forgiveness and the troops began to disperse.
On December 1, Greeve wrote to Batavia explaining his strategy: he had nothowever it might have appeared from what he had said-intended actually to depose the Sunan without the Governor-General's authorization, but had judged it useful to give the impression that he did in fact intend to take this ultimate step. His plan to put Mangkunδgara on the throne had been purely a precaution for the eventuality that the Sunan himself took the step of leaving his capital. This was the end of the crisis: after this, and for the rest of the period covered by the diary, Surakarta life returned to its normal tenor, which was not, as we have seen, entirely dull.
From this point on, a "reconciliation" between the Sunan and the Dutch began, and the troops and officers and kumpSni officials began to return to their normal
The crisis did, however, leave behind some problems which were not to be resolved within the period covered by the diary. The damage claims by both sides were finally settled as follows: the Surakarta side estimated their losses at 16,000 real and the Sultan his at 10-11,000. The Sultan, therefore, agreed to pay 4,000 to Surakarta, which was accepted as satisfactory.
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There is no record of what part of the 4,000 real went to Mangkunδgara.
It is clear from the V.O.C. letters of the period immediately following that the alliance of interests between the two Surakarta princely houses had now definitely broken down, as a result of the different ways in which Pakubuwana and Mangkunδgara had withdrawn from confrontation with the Company. The Company, however, once it had brought about the peaceful installation of the Yogyakarta Crown Prince (this took place on April 2, 1792),also wished to ensure the succession of Mangkunδgara 7 s heir, Prang Wadana, to his grandfather's position, supported by the same grant of land and labor, the 4,000 cacah granted to Mangkunδgara by Pakubuwana III. Pakubuwana IV objected to making this grant hereditary, saying that he had a numerous family to provide for, and that his father had granted the 4,000 cacah for Mangkunδgara τ s lifetime only. He requested that the grant to Mangkunδgara τ s heir be reduced to 2,000 cacah, or that at the very least, all Mangkunδgara's holdings over and above 4,000 cacah should be surrendered: these included the wadana-ship of Banyumas and the districts of Panjδr and Pamδrden. Governor P. G. van Overstraten, considering 4,000 cacah the necessary minimum endowment to maintain the Mangkunδgaran house as a substantial ally for the Company, accepted the second proposal, and an agreement was drawn up at a conference between Governor and Sunan on August 8, 1792. Prang Wadana would be a Pangeran, but would not bear his grandfather's "high title" of Pangeran Adipati. The diarist makes it quite clear that the drinking of alcohol was a special departure from the Sunan τ s usual custom. In the Mangkunδgaran, of course, alcohol was regularly served at festivities.
173. See, for example, 251R (the Sunan f s reception of Greeve).
174. 264R. jαZαί (or dαjαZ) is the Antichrist who, according to Muslim eschatology, will appear before the Day of Resurrection. The diarist records his alleged appearance in the briefest terms and it is a matter of speculation whether or not this is intended as an omen of the imminence of the last days. This is an extremely interesting formulation. First, we see Mangkunδgara, who had for so long relied on his own strength, now in his old age brought to accept the fact that it was the Company that guaranteed his present position. Second, we find an acknowledgment of Company rule over the whole of Java, including the Sunan and the Sultan. The sources used by Ricklefs, in contrast, apparently present this relationship between the Sultan and the Company as one of alliance, rather than of dependency on a sovereign power.
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Sometimes the relationship is described in familial terminology: the Governor-General is the eyang (grandfather) of the Javanese rulers. Mangkunδgara also represents his relationship with the Company in this terminology, though the word used (anak, "child") implies rather less distance. In the case of the Sunan and the Sultan, however, the relationship is presented as one of power and subordination unmodulated by these familial overtones: they are "ruled ττ by the Company. This is not the only acknowledgment from a Javanese source of the Company τ s power over all Java, 180 but it is nevertheless interesting in that it comes from within the central Javanese aristocracy, and suggests-even given its tendentious desire to point up the impotence of Mangkunδgara's rivals, the Sunan and the Sultan-that the extent of Company power over all Java was by no means discounted there, even by those who would have been reluctant to acknowledge it publicly.
The diarist τ s other claim, that Mangkunδgara was not obliged to attend court at the Garδbδg celebrations, ran counter to the explicit provision among the terms of the 1757 agreement that he should do just this.
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It is equally clear from the diary that MangkunSgara actually attended the Sunan ! s court as little as possible and, as noted above, Resident Palm had on one occasion reported him to higher authority for not attending the Garδbeg Mulud celebrations.
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Attending or not attending on the occasion of the Garδbδg was a matter of particular significance, for it was then that all those who owed service to the Sunan were expected to appear at court as evidence of their continuing loyalty; and even during the period of his political alliance with the Pakubuwanan kraton, such a public affirmation of subordinate status was something that Mangkunβgara avoided as long as possible .
177.
292L.
178.
On the use of the term ττ wong anggur" to indicate a person who was not bound to perform service for anyone, see note 45 above.
179.
Ricklefs, Jogjakarta, pp. 371-425. 
182.
See above, p. 71.
Conclusion
The juxtaposition of the diary record and the account given in the V.O.C. letters of the period gives the historian a perhaps unique opportunity to compare two types of original record, one Dutch and one Javanese, before their reworking into official "histories." One might very well expect that records from two such divergent organizations as a Javanese princely kraton and a Dutch trading company would differ greatly in their perceptions of the important issues of the period. The comparison made here reveals that this is not the case. The area where the two records coincide is greater than where they diverge, and their divergence can be attributed more to the necessity of both sides keeping certain secrets, and to imperfections in their means of gathering information, than to differences in their perception of the overall situation.
Taken together, the diary and the V.O.C. records of the time provide sufficient evidence (despite the problems, discussed below, in using this material) to attempt a reconstruction of Mangkunδgara τ s role in Surakarta politics and the motivation behind his actions. Three decades before the development of the crisis described above, the V.O.C. had made, and then perpetuated, the mistake of leaving Mangkunδgara,and his large household of family and followers, without a secure provision for their support, in immediate proximity to one of the two major Javanese princely houses. The Company envisaged MangkunSgara as a "wall" between these two houses, and its officials referred to him as "our prince," expecting loyal service from him. Yet he had profited from his alliance with the V.O.C. only to the extent of receiving a small endowment, which was, moreover, not even secured to his heirs. After several decades in this unsatisfactory position, and with any hope of further advancement from the Company unfulfilled, it was hardly surprising that he and his heirs should consider whether a different alliance would bring better returns. As we have seen, even the weak and old Pakubuwana III showed interest in finding out whether Mangkunegara was prepared to intensify his quarrel with Yogyakarta, or not.
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And when his more aggressive son embarked upon a policy of "standing firm against Mataram and the Company" (that the two were inseparably linked in the Surakarta view is one of the interesting insights provided by the diary), Mangkunegara had to decide how much he stood to gain or lose if he agreed to join the Sunan, and therefore enquired from Greeve whether the Company did in fact intend to give him or his descendants the throne of Mataram when the Sultan died, as he claimed he had been promised. It is clear that his sons and grandsons, moved by the fire of youth and their uncertain prospects, were also exerting considerable pressure on him to grasp the initiative firmly at this point. When (by September 4th) he had ascertained that the Company denied his claims to the throne of Mataram (and even reproached him for making them), he formed an alliance with Pakubuwana IV, at the same time demanding of Greeve such an impossibly high price for his continued cooperation with the V.O.C. that he must have felt himself to be in a position to take a very hard line with the Company. Whether he calculated that he would be able to reduce his price in subsequent negotiations should the development of events make rapprochement with the V.O.C. the wiser course, we are not really in a position to know. Mangkunδgara subsequently abandoned his alliance with Pakubuwana for two related reasons: the Sunan had left the MangkunSgaran forces to do the fighting on their own (the diarist τ s claim is borne out by the archival evidence); and, after initial successes against the Yogyakarta forces, Mangkunegara τ s men began to get the worst of the passages of arms. He therefore agreed to accept Greeve τ s offer of 4,000 real per annum, 183. See above, p. 70.
which he had earlier refused. Nevertheless, we can see from the diary that this yielding to the Company τ s pressure was something which he felt had to be excused. He did so on the grounds of his age and the Sunan ! s failure to give him the support promised. These are grounds peculiar to his particular situation, and there is no evidence that he felt warfare was no longer conceivable as the ultimate political stratagem by this period. 18ίf Rather, failure to live up the Mangkunδgaran martial values was something which had to be explained away.
The above account has dealt with the crisis of 1790 in rather more detail than is found in Ricklefs τ chapter on the subject, 185 particularly on the issue of the name "Mangkubumi," Hartsinck τ s role, the military preparations of the V.O.C. (troop movements July to September 1790), and Pakubuwana IV ! s different proposals. Such detailed treatment has brought out certain questions of interpretation. On the central question of Pakubuwana IV T s aims, Ricklefs has concluded that Greeve allowed himself to be fed a "mass of rumor" by those at court who had lost out in the Sunan τ s replacement of his chief officials, and should have realized that Pakubuwana wanted no more than what he had requested on October 3: that Surakarta be recognized as the senior kraton, that the money from the pasisir should be paid entirely to Surakarta, and that the pengulu of Surakarta should be senior to those of Yogyakarta and of Sδmarang. He did not, contrary to "rumor," wish to attack the V.O.C., but in fact desired to obtain its support for Surakarta's position.
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Before dismissing these reports as rumor, however, it is worth remarking that Greeve and other representatives of the V.O.C. had to operate within a context in which virtually αlZ their information on the political aims of the Javanese aristocracy was acquired aurally, through the personal testimony of those involved at the center or at the periphery. Neither the Sunan nor his fellow princes produced council minutes, or other records supplying evidence of firm decisions officially taken. The later historian, like the V.O.C. officials, is therefore in a difficult position, and must have good reason for preferring one personal testimony and dismissing another, since each of them has the standing of one version of the truth which a particular person wished to purvey to a specific audience on a specific occasion.
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In these circumstances, we must ask whether there is reason to believe that Pakubuwana IV was more candid in making that particular request than the courtiers were in their statements-or, indeed, than Pakubuwana himself was on other occasions when he requested other things, such as the division of Mataram or, again, the unification of the two kingdoms by means of a marriage between himself and a Yogyakarta princess. It seems to the present writer that the courtier's allegations that Pakubuwana IV was planning to attack the Company are comparatively better corroborated: the diarist τ s record shows that he certainly asked Mangkunδgara to join him in an attack against Yogyakarta and the Company, and this is confirmed also by a Yogyakarta text which alleges that the Sunan wished to conquer Yogyakarta and annihilate the Dutch, as well as to recover the pasisir. 187. The Company's problem in dealing with this sort of testimony is well exemplified by their difficulty in deciding whether Brangtakusuma and his brothers "really," as they periodically claimed, wanted to settle down as law-abiding subjects: see above, p. 74.
188. Ricklefs, Jogjakarta, pp. 318-19. The connection between getting rid of the In attempting to assess how firm Pakυbuwana IV really was in his commitment to this proposal made to MangkunSgara, we are faced with a difficult problem fundamental to the historian's understanding of other cultures at other times: the interaction of individual personality, social and political conditions and institutions, and what may be broadly termed "cultural factors." From the evidence of his later career, there can be little doubt that Pakubuwana IV was neither distinguished in military leadership nor a particularly astute politician. In P. B. R. Carey f s detailed analysis of the "sepoy conspiracy" we see this Sunan once more employing the tactic he had used with MangkunSgara: encouraging another party to act openly against a common enemy, and then leaving his ally in the lurch.
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Since this tactic would seem to have accomplished little beyond exasperating both parties with him, his use of it can, with some justification, be seen as indicating that Pakubuwana personally lacked the capacity to follow through his chosen strategy. Yet his strategies themselves do not appear eccentric or even atypical if we view them against the background of political behavior throughout the eighteenth century. Indeed, it is possible that in making this multiplicity of proposals the Sunan was reproducing a common pattern: a preliminary process of bargaining, bluff, and exploratory moves, which would eventually lead to a realignment of the chief political forces according to the balance of strengths and weaknesses revealed by this very process. As a new contender for power, Pakubuwana IV was attempting to establish how far and by what means he could improve his present position. In a sense, he desired all the things which he had proposed, or, more precisely, all those that a working alliance could bring about. Since this process inevitably made not only allies but also enemies, it had, under the conditions prevailing before 1755, which encouraged individuals to pursue their interests by taking up arms, naturally led to a determination of the strength or weakness of the different parties by force majeure. What Pakubuwana IV apparently did not realize was that not only did the V.O.C. not wish to see central Java undergo another of the political rearrangements or shakedowns which this form of political maneuvering brought about, but that it was able to deploy very considerable resources to prevent this. The Company did not wish the contestants to reenter the arena to determine their respective military and political strengths--which was in a sense ironical, since it had itself supplied not a little of the motivation behind the contest. On a number of occasions during the eighteenth century, the Company τ s support had been crucial in making and un-making rulers, from the unfortunate Mangkurat III onwards. It must have been quite clear to Javanese of high birth from their own and their fathers' political experience that the V.O.C.'s decisions were based only partly on considerations of legitimacy, and for the rest on considerations of political expediency. The Company had entered into alliances with those princes with whom they could profitably be concluded. Such princes had to be, obviously enough, those who were willing to cooperate (at least after a certain point in their careers). They also had to be, at least when the Company found itself hard pressed, men able to command a substantial following and to maintain themselves against opposition. In view of this, it was quite natural for an ambitious man both to try to prove that his was the more legitimate claim (as Mangkunδgara's own son Pangeran Purbanδgara was to do in 1792 when he attempted to convince the visiting Governor van Overstraten that he, and not Mangkunδgara's grandson, Pangeran Surya Prang Wadana, should succeed as MangkunSgara II 190 ), and to establish himself, by force if necessary, as the most formidable figure in his own circle. Since the Javanese aristocracy was growing rapidly (the Mangkunegaran birth-rate was not exceptionally high) and its resources were not, there were many who were interested in establishing their preeminence. Mangkunδgara's inability to prevent his sons from plotting among themselves to cut out other sons from the available appanage lands mirrors on a relatively small scale the situation in the aristocracy as a whole.
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Yet the Company was by the late eighteenth century firmly set against the emergence of the "naturally strong," though when it appeared that his attempts to preserve the status quo had failed and a violent resolution was likely, Greeve reverted once more to the old strategy in his proposal to replace the intransigent Pakubuwana IV with Mangkunδgara, known as someone who could "maintain himself." He did not, in the event, need to use this strategy, because Pakubuwana backed down before the break with the Company became irreparable.
If Pakubuwana IV appears to have been neither particularly astute nor heroic, a man more prone to start things than to carry them through, a historian interested in the personal contributions of the crucial figures in this crisis would have to add that the V.O.C. representatives appear in no more favorable colors. Of the two First Residents at Surakarta who had been sent there with the expectation that they would be vigilant, polite, and ingratiating, alert to the development of trends harmful to the Company and quick to initiate the action necessary to abort them, neither had fulfilled these expectations. Palm had, by his excessive demands for labor, his interference in court judicial proceedings,and his general rudeness, given the Sunan and his family reason to feel badly oppressed by the V.O.C. with the arrival of Hartsinck an arrogant Resident was replaced by one so complaisant and venal that he was prepared to keep silent, as those who had earlier been forced to accept humiliation prepared their resurgence, and maintained his fainέant stance as tension between the two principalities rose to a level which his superiors would have considered dangerous to the Company τ s interest.
If the Surakarta Residents' shortcomings contributed significantly to the Company^ unpreparedness to deal quickly and informedly with developments there, it is questionable how well Governor Greeve dealt with these developments once they became his responsibility. He was, as Ricklefs suggests, a person of no great personal courage.
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It is clear from his diaries that his favored tactic was to refrain from doing anything to make the Sultan and Sunan suspect that the Company was in any way displeased with them so long as he himself was at their courts; but to instruct the Residents to take a "hard line" with them once he was safely back in Sδmarang. He tended also to take a stand on an issue but subsequently to withdraw from it or change his mind; as when, for example, he withheld payment of the strandgelden (the sum paid each September as rent for the pasisir and its incomes) but shortly afterwards let both rulers have them after all. 193 He was given to sermonizing, especially in his letters to the young Pakubuwana IV, whom he on 190. This attempt on Purbanegara's part is reported in van one occasion exhorted to be magnanimous like the "truly great princes" of the world. 191 * Such an exhortation is hardly likely to have had the desired effect on a young Sunan bent more on the exercise of princely powers than of moral restraint (and indeed, it is hard to see what other truly great princes Greeve had in mind as exemplars). Finally, his letters do not seem to reveal a well-developed political judgment: in many instances he appears to be striving to maintain a "balance" so delicate as to be, in practical terms, inoperable. We see this in his efforts to prepare the Sultan to take to the field in defense of Yogyakarta against Mangkunδ-gara τ s "outrageous pretensions" to its throne, while at the same time enjoining the old and choleric ruler against any premature action; and in his efforts to preserve not only peace on "blessed Java" (as he frequently calls it, apparently without irony) but also a "sufficient" (though not "excessive") degree of rivalry between the two principalities. Although he directed the military preparations competently enough, his ineptitude with the Javanese princes may well have increased their exasperation with the Company and unwillingness to cooperate with it.
It would seem then that, as far as the personal qualities of its representatives were concerned, the Company cannot have been at an advantage. When, among a small representation, three of these were Palm, Hartsinck,and Greeve, it is not surprising that much of its information was inaccurate or late and its tactics sometimes counterproductive. Nevertheless, the Company did enjoy significant advantages. The small size of its personnel was a source of strength as well as sometimes of weakness; and on the whole its personnel were at least reasonably subject to discipline ("united," in view of the behavior of a number of its Residents, would certainly be an untenable claim). Even its most dubious employee, Hartsinck, begged and was granted forgiveness for the faults he had committed.
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This ability to impose discipline is in marked contrast to the Surakarta aristocracy, where even the Mangkunδgaran, which probably really did possess the high degree of corporate spirit and loyalty to its leader which the diarist lays stress upon, was not able to control the ambitious young scions of its line. Within the kraton corporate unity depended very much on this type of comparatively weakly institutionalized esprit de corps; the V.O.C., on the other hand, had a well-established chain of command,in which it was much clearer who had the right to give orders, and what constituted insubordination or dereliction of duty.
There are several reasons for this contrast. The Dutch employees of the V.O.C. were foreigners in a land where life would have been difficult for them if they abandoned their loyalty to the Company and decided to chance their own arm or make other alliances. Though outright defections had occurred, they were few in number. 196 Again, the Company τ s employees were bound by economic ties much more directly to their employers than was the case for those in the service of Javanese princes. Despite the stereotype of the underpaid, and therefore corrupt and disloyal, Company servant, those who rose to respectable rank were well compensated and knew that they would enjoy the fruits of office. does not provide evidence that Pakubuwana really shared the Indian sepoys' religious beliefs, however much he may have been interested in their Hindu ceremonies and in the shared religious past of India and Java. What he may well have shared with them is an early mode of cultural nationalism-some might say xenophobia-in the face of European encroachment, of which a previous manifestation in the period covered here may be seen in his banning of European dress in favor of Javanese or Middle-Eastern styles. On the other hand, it is clear from both Dutch and Javanese accounts that Pakubuwana was making a considerable effort to appear as a patron and promoter of Islam, regularly attending the Friday prayer, and sometimes himself delivering the kutbah, instructing his men on the duty of performing the prayers regularly, building a replica of the Dδmak mosque, and proscribing alcohol and opium. It is less easy to ascertain whether he was personally-as opposed to politically-a devout Muslim, though he did specially solicit a Koran written by Mangkunδgara and was at least well enough schooled to make a convincing instructor and kutbah-reader. Nor is it claimed that a Javanese aristocrat of this period would have considered that obedience to the prescriptions of Islam meant, necessarily or potentially, a proscription of those elements of his cultural and intellectual life which derived from other, older Javanese traditions.
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What remains is a strong support of Islam, a policy which his forefathers had also considered proper or useful: his grandfather, Pakubuwana II, had been the founder of a number of pδsantren, including the famous Tegalsari, which Pakubuwana IV continued to patronize. 201 * During the reign of his father, Pakubuwana III, it had been a member of Mangkunδgara τ s kaum who was appointed as liaison officer between the two Surakarta kraton, 205 and it is likely that Islam continued to provide links between the two kraton under Pakubuwana IV, given its central role in the Mangkunδgaran.
The diary provides a perhaps surprising amount of evidence of the dominant place of Islam as an organizing principle in at least one Javanese court; and on the other hand, no evidence of the currency of pre-or non-Islamic "Javanist" philosophies. This lack of evidence of the latter body of tradition does not prove that it played no part in Javanese intellectual life, since the diary is a record of political practice and not of philosophical ideas. Nevertheless, the positive evidence of this notable practical commitment to Islamic ibαdαh remains, and it seems likely that future scholars will need to reassess the contribution of Islam to norms of social and political behavior in eighteenth-century central Java.
There were however perceptible differences in the way the two men, Pakubuwana IV and Mangkunδgara, expressed their religious commitment: Pakubuwana ! s proscription of alcohol would hardly have been popular in the hard-drinking 203. A related question is the extent to which extra-court representatives of Islam, the kyai and the pδsantren community, did feel at this period that commitment to Islam should be exclusive of such elements and might have put pressure on the court to follow such a line,as the price for their support of the ruler. The evidence for and against this proposition cannot be considered here.
MangkunSgaran. And in general, it seems that the martial pride of the Mangkunδ-garan, where, as we have seen, something of the atmosphere of the "armed camp" kraton of earlier decades was still maintained, tended to despise the somewhat bloodless tone of the court of Pakubuwana and his brothers. There is an amusing description of the abysmal showing made by the Sunan's brother, Mangkubumi, at a court dance performance, so that (the diarist claims) even the Resident was disgusted at the sight of this "limp priyayi" (priyayi Zαnαs) attempting the martial beksa while looking as if he were frightened of something.
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During the nineteenth century a refined, renunciatory official culture would be perfected, which is usually referred to by this same term, "priyayi," now carrying a connotation of sought-after status. The Mangkunδgaran, in contrast, clearly represents the lifestyle of the old Javanese noblesse d'έpδe, still insisting on the old martial values, but never again to dominate in the way it once had done.
Not all of the general conclusions which seem to emerge from this study of political developments in Surakarta accord with those put forward by Ricklefs on the basis of his pioneering study of Yogyakarta at the same period-a study which is without doubt a remarkable tour de force and a work of immense usefulness, without which subsequent scholarly work on these decades would have been immeasurably poorer. Nevertheless, the evidence for Surakarta, represented by the diary in combination with Dutch records, suggests that some of Ricklefs τ conclusions regarding the Javanese aristocracy as a whole may need reexamination.
The clear evidence of the court's commitment to Islam-whose influence in central Java must be seen, in the opinion of the present writer, to have been much stronger than Ricklefs acknowledges-has already been discussed; as has the evidence that Javanese aristocrats were not, after all, impervious at this period to the force of the Company τ s claims (largely unspoken though these were) to "rule" them. Ricklefs also diagnoses a major change in the overall political program of the Javanese aristocracy during the latter half of the eighteenth century, in which they "eliminated" certain political "options," which were found to be no longer viable under the changed circumstances of the divided kingdom; and takes the Surakarta crisis of 1790 as a watershed in this general trend. He writes: "The elder generation of the Javanese courtly elite had accepted the fact of division. But some of the younger generation had not yet learned the lesson of its necessity. They were soon to do so"; 207 and concludes that by the end of the period described here the Javanese had "decided warfare could not resolve their central problem." 208 This is a large statement, and one which gives rise to certain problems. "The Javanese" (even the Javanese ruling class) do not exist as an organic entity any more than do "the French" or "the Americans," and, if one wishes to invest them with decision-making powers, one must ask by what means they could arrive at a consensus for the solution of a problem, or even decide what their "central problem" was. The Javanese state was notably weak in institutions by which common programs could be formulated and carried out, either through a well-established order of rank or chain of command (as illustrated by the constant rivalry among the numerous sons of the first Sultan of Yogyakarta who had claims upon the succession, 206. 291L. The term "priyayi" appears to be used here in the sense of "junior prince," rather than a member of the bureaucratic nobility. 207. Ricklefs, Jogjakarta, p. 284. 208. Ibid., p. 415. and between Crown Prince and Sultan), or by conciliar or consultative mechanisms (which could not draw in those pangeran and other notables who had decided to forsake the court and defy its authority in the regions).
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One becomes increasingly conscious of what a fragile-at times even a notional-thing we refer to as "the Javanese state." At the period with which we are concerned, the formalization of the cadastral affairs of the principalities, of consultative procedures for settling disputes between their respective subjects, and so on, was well underway, owing not a little to Dutch pressure in this direction. Yet the problem of obtaining a political consensus seems to have remained intractable. We have seen how difficult it was even for the Mangkunδgaran-one among three kraton-to impose a common political program and an agreed tactical approach on all its members. For the aristocracy as a whole, there is no evidence that a consensus was developed through either formal or informal consultation: rather the reverse. There is no reason to suppose that either the older generation or the younger had, as a whole, learned to renounce warfare. Even after his retreat in 1790, Pakubuwana IV would not seem to have learned this lesson, in view of his later involvement in the sepoy conspiracy. While he seems to have favored the tactic of using an ally as "front man" (perhaps a technique learned from his father, who, as we have seen, showed interest in using Mangkunegara in this way), this was, nevertheless, directed towards engineering the overthrow by violence of the established order, from which he evidently hoped to profit. (It might also be noted that we find Pakubuwana IV pursuing in 1790 another of the old political strategies which Ricklefs sees as having now been abandoned-marriage diplomacy. 210 )
In fact, both the evidence of the diary and that of the V.O.C. archives record the existence of a continuing low-level turbulence-by no means every incident of which has been mentioned in the present account, which has necessarily been limited to developments of major importance. This continuing turbulence beyond, but not far beyond, the capitals, came partly from the initiative of Yogyakarta too, for sorties were sent out from there when circumstances seemed to suggest that there was a chance of seizing an advantage by doing so. If the usual dampening factors were significantly weakened, and an ambitious prince decided to seize the opportunity presented, such skirmishes were likely to escalate into warfare on a larger scale.
Of the dampening factors which usually prevented such an escalation, the one which operated with the greatest consistency was the presence of the V.O.C., committed to a far more rigid and permanent political order than the notably fluid one which had existed for so long. In analyzing the crisis of 1790, the present writer has stressed the relative effectiveness of the V.O.C. τ s ordering presence in dampening conflict, at least when it had flared up to an unacceptable level, an effectiveness attributed to its more highly organized structure and its far more mobile military and economic resources. Its military forces may have been quantitatively inferior to those which the three central Javanese kraton might, hypothetically, together have called into the field,had they united in such an effort 211 -though 209. This aspect of the Javanese state is well described by Ricklefs in ibid., ch. 1, esp. pp. 18-26.
210. Ibid., ch. 4,describes the abandonment of marriage diplomacy as a means of reuniting the divided kingdom at an earlier period. See, however, p. 93 above on Pakubuwana IV T s attempts to arrange his marriage to a Yogyakarta princess.
211. Ricklefs states (ibid. , p. 415) that the partition of the kingdom in 1755-57 rendered unlikely a uniting of Javanese armies against the Dutch. In the present numerical superiority is not the only factor to be considered in calculating military advantage-but its economic resources were undoubtedly of a superior order.
If this assessment of the relative effectiveness of the V.O.C. appears to be much like a restatement of an old colonial myth, it may perhaps be said that the myth contains, at least for a certain period of time, a measure of truth, and that it is this which explains the heavy intellectual bonds which it was able to impose upon the colonized. At other periods, of course, the colonial strengths may well be transformed into weaknesses, since superior economic resources may produce a prodigality which can be attacked by those who know how to make do with less, and the "perfecting" of military and bureaucratic structures becomes a self-sustaining process with little relation to realities. Then the colonized reveal their own strengths, rejecting the role allocated to them by the myth. These strengths develop in response to severe problems, and those created by the intrusion of the V.O.C. into Javanese life at this period were by no means small. Ricklefs concludes that adaptation to these changed circumstances was only partially successful and very serious problems remained unsolved. He also suggests that, with more men of great leadership qualities, such as Mangkubumi and Mangkunδgara, a new type of political system might have developed.
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On the evidence presented here, could Mangkunδgara have been expected to contribute significantly to such a renovation? He was, without doubt, a man of great leadership qualities, possessing in superabundance the capacities which had made a prince preeminent among his peers in the old way of life. He was a military commander of notable subtlety, and himself a great warrior, excelling in archery and horsemanship. He was widely respected and beloved for his personal qualities, not just his military prowess but also his excellence in other fields: he was an enthusiastic dancer of the beksa and other traditional styles, and a stern critic of the performance of others; and he could as well turn his hand to writing out the Koran and instructing his followers on their religious duties. He was not, furthermore, without the capacity to change with changing times. Of the three youthful princes-Mangkunδgara himself, Buminata and Singasari-who had begun their military careers together in opposition to the V.O.C., the two others had persisted in this opposition to the end. One died in chains in Batavia and the other in exile in Ceylon. Though Mangkunegara himself at first believed that his sheer primacy on the battlefield allowed him to insist on accession to the throne of Mataram as sole ruler, something the Company could not possibly have countenanced in view of its commitment to the existing ruler, he did ultimately accept the necessity of compromise, and was provided with a settlement, undoubtedly less than he would have received had he made a more correct judgment earlier, but nevertheless better than death or exile. At the end of his career we see him reconciled to his situation as the "child of the Company," and asking for instruction on how to grow the new export crops whose cultivation the Company wished to promote.
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Yet despite his capacity for political adaptability and openness to contracting the alliance which seemed most helpful to him at a particular juncture (not least in the period whose events are described here), there are no signs of the reformer or innovator utilizing a systematic approach, desiring the construction of new forms of social and political organization writer's opinion, such a united force was equally unlikely, because of structural and institutional weaknesses, under the old, "undivided" kingdom (and had never in fact occurred except, arguably, in the 1628-29 campaigns of Sultan Agung). To look back to the pre-1755 situation as one of "one king, one kingdom" is to focus on an ideal at the expense of reality. But this is another question. Ill better suited to changed times, criticizing the old society and its values as an effective process of renovation would have required. It may be that the diary is an inadequate reflection of the intellectual dimension of MangkunSgara τ s personality but there is no other evidence of such qualities in him, and it is reasonable to suppose that a prince whose remarkable endowments so destined him for preeminence in the old order was not one we might expect to see as architect of the new.
Errata (Part I) p. 3, note 5: for "metanym or transliteration" read "metonym or tralatition. ττ p. 4, line 9: should read "and, at at least weekly intervals. ..." p. 5, note 12: for "Bezantschapsreizen" read "Gezantschapsreizen."
note 15: for "Nederlantsche" read "Nederlandtsche." p. 22, verse 2: for "dikir" read "dikir." p. 29, note 162: for "7,354" read "7,794." p. 44, verse 2, line 2: for "piyambak" read "tiyambak." p. 45, note 244: for "awawuh" read "awuwuh."
Verse separation should occur p. 8 between lines 10 and 11 p. 14 between lines 2 and 3. p. 15 between "kehnya kang salat ing masjid" and "pan tigang atus sawidak."
